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he recovery of John Milton’s De doctrina Christiana in
1823 from the Old State Paper Office in Whitehall, where the
manuscript lay forgotten for nearly 150 years, led to a scandalous
revelation: the great Protestant poet and tireless champion of English
republicanism maintained a host of heterodox views, including one of
the most ancient and reviled Christian heresies, Arianism.1 Arians reject the Athanasian conception of the Trinity and hold that the Son of
God is a finite being, generated in time, whose exalted status depends
on the will of the Father. Defined and anathematized in the fourth century, this anti-Trinitarian heresy gained new traction in the late seventeenth century among moral and natural philosophers—Locke and
Newton are the best-known examples—committed to the historically
rigorous interpretation of scripture and to the rational formulation of
religious doctrine. Since the nineteenth century, critics committed to
the orthodoxy of Milton and his epic have sought to protect the poet
from his own deeply held religious views by minimizing the relation
between Paradise Lost and his theological treatise (his “dearest and
best possession” [De doctrina 121]). The recent attempt to exclude De
doctrina from the Miltonic canon is a particularly vivid example of this
strategy at work.2 But the heretical Christology that Milton takes pains
to articulate and defend in De doctrina is crucial to our understanding
of Paradise Lost. By embracing Arianism and deemphasizing the spectacle of the Crucifixion in his theory of salvation, or soteriology, Milton
breaks with two definitive theological tenets that have been central to
Christianity ever since it became a state religion under Constantine.3
These heresies constitute the theological underpinnings of his radical
republicanism, which upholds an idea of human dignity and agency
antithetical to the tyrannical politics of torture and blood sacrifice.
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Amongst innumerable Stars, that shone
Stars distant, but nigh hand seem’d other
   Worlds,
Or other Worlds they seem’d, or happy Isles,
Like those Hesperian Gardens fam’d of old,
Fortunate Fields, and Groves and flow’ry
   Vales,
Thrice happy Isles, but who dwelt happy there
He stay’d not to enquire.
(lines 565–71)

Intent on reaching earth, the “happy Isle”
of Adam and Eve, Satan leaves these other
“happy Isles” unexplored (2.410). But the
provocative simile that compares these “other
Worlds” to “Hesperian Gardens” invites us
to imagine other garden-bound inhabitants
who may or may not be constrained by their
own forbidden fruit. Later, of course, Raphael
warns Adam, “Dream not of other Worlds,
what Creatures there / Live, in what state,
condition, or degree” (8.175–76). His point
is not that such worlds do not exist—indeed,
he has just introduced Adam to the possibility that they do—but that Adam should leave
such matters to God and enjoy his own lot.
Instead of closing off speculation, however,
the alliterative emphasis of Raphael’s warning
(“joy thou / In what he gives to thee, this Paradise / And thy fair Eve” [170–72]) encourages
us to believe that the universe contains other
paradises and, perhaps, other Eves.
Fueled by the publication of Copernicus’s
De revolutionibus (1543), early modern conjecture about a plurality of inhabited worlds
carried with it disturbing theological implications. As early as 1549, the Lutheran humanist Philip Melanchthon formulated the
principal objection:
There is one Son of God, our Lord Jesus
Christ, who, when he had gone forth into this

world, died only once and was resurrected. He
did not show himself elsewhere; neither did he
die nor was he resurrected elsewhere. Therefore, it should not be imagined that there are
many worlds, and because of this, it should
not be imagined that Christ died and was often resurrected. Nor must it be thought that
in any other world, without knowledge of the
Son of God, men are restored to eternal life.4

Note the emphasis on singularity here: there
is only one Son of God, and he sacrificed
himself only once for the inhabitants of the
one and only created world. The cumulative
effect of these assertions is to insist that there
is only one route to salvation. It leads through
the Passion and encompasses everyone. Belief
in the existence of other worlds, Melanchthon
fears, would undermine orthodox Christocentric doctrine. Speculation about other
redeemers and other redemptive acts would
diminish the centrality and universal scope
of Christ’s sacrifice and of the atonement.
Moreover, it would raise questions about why
an omnipotent deity who created and governs a multitude of inhabited worlds chose
to be incarnated, crucified, and resurrected
on this one. Thomas Paine, who accepted the
existence of other worlds, demonstrates that
Melanchthon was right to worry. “To believe
that God created a plurality of worlds at least
as numerous as what we call stars,” he argues
in The Age of Reason, Part I (1794), “renders
the Christian system of faith at once little
and ridiculous and scatters it in the mind like
feathers in the air. The two beliefs cannot be
held together in the same mind; and he who
thinks that he believes in both has thought
but little of either” (303).
Milton would have disagreed. Instead
of seeing the possibility of other worlds as a
threat to his faith, he found reassurance in it.
In Paradise Lost, he repeatedly turns our attention to this possibility: invoking Galileo’s
telescope observations, the narrator implies
that the moon may be another earth (1.287–
91, 5.261–63); Raphael’s f light “between
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This heterodox view of the Son and his
sacrifice finds its cosmological counterpart in an infinite universe with a plurality
of worlds. In book 3 of Paradise Lost, Satan
soars through the newly created universe
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worlds and worlds” reinforces the likelihood
that the stars of our universe are other worlds
(5.268); and although Satan’s Lucretian claim
that “Space may produce new Worlds” is misleading, it reminds us that God can raise more
universes out of Chaos, if he chooses (1.650).
Yet Milton scholars, more focused on whether
he leans toward a Ptolemaic or Copernican
cosmos, tend to deflect or dismiss the theological implications of his universe. For instance,
Harinder Singh Marjara suggests that Milton
was drawn to “a universe that flew in the face
of Aristotelianism and Christian orthodoxy”
merely because of “its poetic possibilities”
(80). But Milton’s cosmos accommodates his
heterodox theology. The idea of a plurality
of worlds exerts two contrary pressures on
the Trinity: it exalts the omnipotence of the
creator, while it limits the significance of the
redeemer. In effect, it produces a tension best
resolved by rejecting the dogma of the Trinity and adopting the Arian belief that God the
Father and the Son of God are two distinct
beings—the former uncreated, infinite, and
immutable and the latter created, finite, and
changeable. In De doctrina Christiana, Milton
takes this heretical view, declaring it “more
clearly deducible from the text of the scripture than the currently accepted doctrine”
(203), and in Paradise Lost he situates the Father (“Omnipotent, / Immutable, Immortal,
Infinite, / Eternal King” [3.372–74]) and the
Son (“of all Creation first, / Begotten Son, Divine Similitude” [383–84]) in a cosmos that
many of his contemporaries found incompatible with their orthodox Trinitarian God.
Whereas others took comfort in the idea
of one world governed by a single Christian
doctrine, Milton embraced God’s infinite
power to create and celebrated the multiplicity of that creation. Indeed, his poetic universe can be seen as a cosmic correlative of his
views on intellectual freedom and religious
tolerance. In Areopagitica (1644), he suggests
that truth “may have more shapes then one,”
subverting claims predicated on the assump-
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tion that there is only one world because there
is only one path to salvation (563). Likewise,
the cosmos that Milton hints at in Paradise
Lost reflects the views on tolerance and nonconformity that he sets out in Of True Religion
(1673): his rejection of a single, monolithic
church that subsumes both political and
ecclesiastical power in favor of a plurality of
religious sects corresponds to his preference
for a plurality of worlds. He maintains that
Protestant sects as divergent as Lutherans,
Calvinists, Anabaptists, Arians, Socinians,
and Arminians have been taught by the divine Spirit “all things absolutely necessary to
salvation” (424). Throughout his later writings, from Areopagitica onward, Milton tends
to destabilize political, religious, and intellectual monopolies by dispersing power and
authority to multiple sites. Instead of a single,
divinely ordained monarch, for instance, Milton invests political authority in all men: “No
man who knows ought, can be so stupid to
deny that all men were borne free, being the
image and resemblance of God himself.”5
By stressing the possibility of other “Hesperian Gardens” in Paradise Lost, Milton does
exactly what Melanchthon fears and dislodges
Christ’s sacrifice from its central position,
both cosmically and theologically. By embracing Arianism, he goes even further and
redefines the nature of that sacrifice. God—
or, rather, the second person of the Christian
Godhead—no longer dies on the cross; the Son
of God, a created being distinct from the one
true God, dies instead. In Paradise Lost, then,
cosmology and theology converge to transform the significance of the Son’s sacrifice for
humankind and thus the relation between the
Father, the Son, and the individual believer.
As I will argue later, Milton enlists the classical friendship tradition to help him recast the
sacrifice as an ethical decision, shifting our attention from Christ’s suffering on the cross to
the Son’s heroic offer to die for Man. This tradition provides him with examples of friends
whose sublime devotion and self-s acrifice

125.2

]

The Crucifixion
More than two decades before he began work
on De doctrina in the mid to late 1650s, Milton
displays a resistance to the Passion, and especially the Crucifixion, that separates him from
mainstream Protestantism and points toward
his future heterodoxy. Protestant reflection on
the Passion of Christ tended to prompt emotional responses—frequently a profound sense
of sinfulness and depravity linked to worthlessness, helplessness, and dejection—antithetical to Milton’s sense of himself. Examining
the role of Calvinist Passion narratives in
early modern Eng land, Debora Shuger avers
“these texts attempt to produce a specific version of Christian selfhood—a divided selfhood
gripped by intense, contradictory emotions,”
and she finds that “Christ’s agony provided
the primary symbol for early modern speculation on selfhood and society. The tortured
and torturing males who supply the dramatis
personae of the Crucifixion . . . haunt the interior landscape of the Puritan automachia” (9,
127). Michael Schoenfeldt draws similar conclusions about the role of Christ’s sacrifice in
devotional poetry. Poems by Donne, Herbert,
and Milton, he contends, look at the Passion
“through squinting eyes amid slumping postures, as if they were glimpsing a trauma too
immense for human comprehension” (562).

Instead of dwelling on the actual Crucifixion,
they focus on their inability to respond to it.
“The fitting object of sacrifice,” he writes, “is
the tacitly arrogant self that would claim to
be able to respond appropriately to this event”
(564). Schoenfeldt makes a compelling case
for Donne and Herbert. But Milton provides
him with a much more limited example: the
incomplete eight-stanza poem “The Passion,”
which Milton attempted after his successful
ode “On the Morning of Christ’s Nativity.”
Nonetheless, Schoenfeldt suggests that “The
Passion” “offers a formal version of the stuttering inability to respond to Christ’s sacrifice”
and concludes that for Milton, as for Donne
and Herbert, “Christ’s sacrifice ultimately defeats poetry” (581).
But Milton would rarely concede defeat in anything. Indeed, throughout all his
works, nothing is more rare than admissions
of inability or failure. At times, his confidence
in his own abilities seems almost limitless. In
his poem Mansus (1638–39), the young, unknown Milton imagines himself, after “no
silent career,” being rewarded for the brilliant
literary works he has yet to write:
So I should rest in perfect peace. Then, if
there be such a thing as faith and assured rewards of the righteous, I myself, far remote
in the ethereal homes of the gods who dwell
in heaven, whither labor and a pure mind
and ardent virtue lead, shall look down upon
these events—as much as the fates permit—
from some part of that mysterious world, and
with a serene spirit and a face suffused with
smiles and rosy light, I shall congratulate myself on ethereal Olympus. (lines 86, 93–100)

In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce
(1643), Milton depicts himself as leading us
out of a “labyrinth of servitude,” a feat that
places his contribution to “civill and human
life” above that of “the inventors of wine and
oyl” (240). There are famous expressions of
doubt and anxiety scattered throughout his
poetry, such as his fear that “an age too late,
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provide a new model for the bond between
redeemer and redeemed. I am not claiming
that Milton’s fascination with other worlds
compelled him to become an Arian. Rather,
the Arianism that he adopted through his
own reading of scripture allowed him to move
past his vexed relation to the Crucifixion and
imagine the poetic universe that we recognize
as distinctively his own. Reflecting on the heresies of De doctrina Christiana, William Kerrigan convincingly concludes, “Milton bent
his religion into conformity with himself ”
(166). Nowhere is this more true, I would argue, than in his heretical view of the Son.
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or cold / Climate, or Years” might undermine
his epic ambitions (Paradise Lost 9.44–45).
But these expressions tend to foreground
rather than diminish his aspirations and accomplishments. If Milton had wanted to make
Christ’s agony central to his poetics, he would
have found a way to do so. “The truth,” as
J. H. Hanford observed long ago, “is that the
Crucifixion was not a congenial theme to him
at any time. Even thus early he seems to have
felt instinctively that man’s salvation depends
upon himself and that he needs Christ as a
guide and model rather than as a redeemer”
(145). Instead of linking Milton to Donne and
Herbert, his unfinished poem on the Passion
already marks his distance from them.
Throughout his life, Milton rejects the
model of reformed selfhood that seeks to install the Crucifixion as its central scene. As a
poet, he stands and waits; he does not squint
or slouch. His unwillingness to assume the
prostrate position of a fallen creature struggling to accept its own unworthiness helps explain the success of the Nativity Ode and the
failure of “The Passion.” In the ode, the poet
harmonizes his inspired voice with “the Angel
Choir” so seamlessly that he never needs to
speak in the first-person singular (line 27). He
observes that Christ will release “our deadly
forfeit,” bringing about “[o]ur great redemption,” glorification, and bliss, but he is more
preoccupied with Christ’s heroics than with
human depravity (6, 4). When the proleptic
fantasy that the Incarnation will immediately
destroy sin and restore “the age of gold” is cut
short by the recognition that this infant “on
the bitter cross / Must redeem our loss,” the
poem quickly recasts Christ as a Herculean
figure conquering Satan and his minions from
the cradle: “Our Babe, to show his Godhead
true, / Can in his swaddling bands control the
damned crew” (135, 152–53, 227–28). In the
final stanza, a peaceful image of the sleeping
child (“the Virgin blest, / Hath laid her Babe
to rest”) is qualified by a description of the
angels prepared for battle: “And all about the
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Courtly Stable, / Bright-harness’d Angels sit in
order serviceable” (237–38, 243–44). The poet
who joined their choir does not break ranks
to rejoin the nameless multitude of fallen humanity; he waits for his call to arms as well.
The unity of the Nativity Ode—the heroic
infant and his militant followers biding time
before the final battle—eludes Milton when
he attempts to compose a companion piece on
the Passion. He can no longer share the perspective of the angelic host, who have no part
in the atonement. He now sings in a solitary
human voice: “For now to sorrow must I tune
my song, / And set my Harp to notes of saddest woe” (8–9). His Christ remains Herculean, so much so that it is hard to imagine this
“Most perfect Hero, tried in heaviest plight /
Of labors huge and hard, too hard for human
wight” dying on the cross, especially since
his human identity is described as merely “a
Mask” and “disguise” for his omnipotence
(13–14, 19). But the real problem is the restless, self-conscious speaker, who is unable to
approach the subject with sufficient humility.
The supplicant posture and inner torment of
a creature implicated in the horrific death of
its loving savior and unworthy of the redemption that it hopes to receive seem utterly alien
to him. Although he claims that his “sorrows
are too dark for day to know,” they do not
impair him in any way (33). Nor does Milton
relinquish the heroic tropes that are his poetic signature: the prophetic status (“See, see
the Chariot and those rushing wheels, / That
whirl’d the Prophet up at Chebar flood” [36–
37]), rapt visions (“There doth my soul in holy
vision sit / In pensive trance” [41–42]), winged
flight (“I thence hurried on viewless wings”
[50]), and Orphic powers (“I . . . / Might think
th’infection of my sorrows loud / Had got a
race of mourners” [54–56]). The poem ends
prematurely because Milton refuses to make
the sacrifice that the genre requires: he will
not adopt a poetic identity that rejects personal heroism and dwells despairingly on his
own status as a fallen creature.

125.2

]

like Herbert, who places Christ’s sacrifice at
the center of his poetics, Milton traces his poetic power back to God’s power as creator. In
his preparation for his prophetic role in Paradise Lost, the blind bard implores the divine
Spirit for a rebirth that echoes the first act of
creation: “What in me is dark / Illumine, what
is low raise and support” (1.22–23).
Milton refuses to internalize the Crucifixion—and thus rejects the normative model of
Protestant subjectivity that Shuger describes—
because of his own sense of dignity. As Richard Strier observes, Milton “never sustainedly
adopted the Reformation understanding of
humility” and “does not consistently participate in the Reformation attack on the dignity
of man as a rational and (potentially) selfgoverning creature” (268, 280).6 What passes
for Christian humility, Milton asserts in Of
Reformation (1641), is often servility: “men . . .
knew not how to hide their Slavish approach
to Gods behests by them not understood, nor
worthily receav’d, but by cloaking their Servile crouching to all Religious Presentments,
somtimes lawfull, sometimes Idolatrous, under the name of humility” (522). Before the
“dreadfull Idol” of the Catholic mass, deceived men prefer “a foolish Sacrifice” instead
of “a savory obedience to Christs example”
(523). Dignity is Milton’s rallying cry in the
cause of human freedom. Although man is
“created after Gods owne Image,” “nothing
now adayes is more degenerately forgott’n,” he
laments in Tetrachordon (1645), “then the true
dignity of man” (587). This ingrained sense of
dignity leads Milton away from the Crucifixion and toward the Arian Christology of De
doctrina and Paradise Lost.
An Arian Son
Milton often seems more like the intellectual
heir of Italian humanists like Pico della Mirandola than of reformers like Luther or Calvin—more enthralled by human possibility
than human limitation. He would certainly
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This authorial stance is not simply youthful idealism or evidence of an immaturity that
Milton later outgrows. As Stephen Fallon has
demonstrated, Milton’s tendency to view himself “as heroically virtuous, divinely chosen,
and untouched by frailty” emerges in many, if
not most, of his works, and it shapes the soteriology of De doctrina and Paradise Lost (118).
When forced to “contemplat[e] despair and
alienation” in his divorce tracts, for instance,
Milton “immediately . . . reasserts his freedom
from all varieties of imperfection, and thus
implicitly dissociates himself from the fall”
(120). What Milton avoids here are precisely
the feelings that Protestant reflection on the
Passion seeks to provoke: alienation and despair that lead to the denigration of oneself.
Dwelling on Christ’s sacrifice, as Herbert does in The Temple, foregrounds the unbridgeable ontological gulf that divides the
redeemer and the redeemed in Christian orthodoxy, and it reminds individual believers
of their impaired state as fallen beings and the
irreparable debt that they owe the redeemer.
This emphasis yields poems like Herbert’s
“Love (III),” where the speaker must come to
terms with his own utter unworthiness as he
learns to passively accept love that he cannot
deserve. Milton never courts this type of selfreflection. He expresses a profound sense of
debt to God: he is fully aware of himself “as a
creature, something made, circumscribed, finite,” who has an obligation to refine and perfect himself as an instrument of God’s glory
(Rumrich, Matter 45). But it is a debt that he
owes to the creator, not the redeemer, and an
obligation that all created beings share. Thus,
this debt foregrounds ontological continuity,
placing human beings—and Milton in particular—in the same category as the angels and
the first created being, the Son of God. All can
be active, heroic servants of God the Father:
Milton, who learns to “stand and wait” in sonnet 19; the serviceable angels of the Nativity
Ode; and Jesus as he stands atop the “highest
pinnacle” in Paradise Regained (4.549). So un-
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have recognized the limitations of Pico’s euphoric fantasy that man could be “maker and
molder” of himself: divorced from God, belief
in one’s own agency is fundamentally satanic
(225). But he never surrendered his belief that
a “clear spirit” who “live[d] laborious days”
could accomplish something if he recognized
God as the source of his identity and power
and acted not for himself but for God’s glory
(Lycidas, lines 70, 72). The Arian position on
the Son of God enables Milton to retain the
ontological mobility that fascinated Renaissance humanists and incorporate it into his
theology. Rejecting the orthodox formulation
that the Son shares the Father’s immutable,
unbegotten, and infinite essence, Milton conceives of the Son as a created being (“the first
of created things”) subject to time, change,
and choice: “God begot the Son as a result
of his own decree . . . within the bounds of
time” (De doctrina 206, 209). Since they “are
not one in essence,” their relation depends on
the harmony or concord between their wills:
“they are one in that they speak and act as
one. . . . [The Son] and the Father are one in
the same way as we are one with him: that is,
not in essence but in love, in communion, in
agreement, in charity, in spirit, and finally
in glory” (220). The Father rewards the Son
for his voluntary obedience to God’s will by
increasing his power and prestige and by bestowing his divine attributes on him: “the Son
admits that he possesses whatever measure of
Deity is attributed to him, by virtue of the peculiar gift and kindness of the Father” (223).
Like all created beings, the Son has the freedom to make moral choices, and by choosing
to obey the will of God in Paradise Lost, he ascends upward until, anointing him “universal
King,” the Father bestows on him the ultimate
reward: “all Power, / I give thee, reign for ever,
and assume / Thy Merits” (3.317–20).
The Son’s identity as a created being
changes his redemptive role: it is his exemplary obedience to God, not his unique essence, that reconciles God and Man. By
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making the redeemer a creature, Arianism
elevates the status and exalts the potential of
all created beings. “The central point in the
Arian system,” Robert Gregg and Dennis
Groh conclude in their study of early Arian
soteriology, “is that Christ gains and holds his
sonship in the same way as other creatures—
thus it is asserted that what is predicated of
the redeemer can and must be predicated
of the redeemed” (67). Throughout De doctrina, Milton concurs, stressing that other
creatures bear the same relation to God that
the Son does. Against those who claim that
the Son is the supreme god because he is “at
times called God and even Jehovah,” Milton
responds “that the name ‘God’ is, by the will
and permission of God the Father, not infrequently bestowed even upon angels and men.
. . . This is done to show us that angels or messengers, even though they may seem to take
upon themselves, when they speak, the name
and character of God, do not speak their own
words but those specified by God, who sent
them” (233, 237). As “the first born among
many brothers,” the Son may be closer to God
than other creatures are, but he is not different in kind (Colossians 1.15; qtd. in 211).
From this perspective, the Passion does
not represent God as sacrificing himself for
Man; it demonstrates the obedience of a perfect creature to the will of God. For Milton,
to make Christ the principal object of devotion, either through ritual or psychological
reenactment, would be to worship a creature,
not the creator. “The ultimate object of faith is
not Christ, the Mediator,” he insists, “but God
the Father. . . . So it does not seem surprising that there are a lot of Jews, and Gentiles
too, who are saved although they believed
or believe in God alone, either because they
lived before Christ or because, even though
they have lived after him, he has not been
revealed to them” (475). Humbling yourself
before the Crucifixion, deliberately sacrificing your dignity and agency, as Donne and
Herbert do, would be placing a servile idol-

125.2
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Heroic Choice
Milton can relegate Christ’s sacrifice to a few
lines toward the end of Paradise Lost because
he has already depicted the Son’s definitive act
of obedience and love. “Virtually, and insofar
as the efficacy of his action is concerned,” he
writes in De doctrina, Christ “offered himself
from the very beginning of the world” (434).
By focusing on the Son’s offer to die for Man
rather than on Christ’s fulfillment of that
pledge, Milton substitutes a voluntary decision
for the spectacular suffering of the Passion.
Instead of passive acceptance and corporeal
martyrdom, this revision allows him to pre
sent active collaboration with God’s will—the
ability to discern it and the deliberate choice
to obey it—as the central heroic act of the epic.
Milton locates this offer in the larger context
of a trial: peering down from “his prospect
high, / Wherein past, present, future he beholds,” the Father vindicates himself and
condemns the fallen angels and Man for their
transgressions (Paradise Lost 3.77–78). He

clears himself of responsibility by citing the
freedom with which he has endowed his creatures (“Sufficient to have stood, though free to
fall” [99–101]) and pronounces two different
sentences: “Man falls deceiv’d / By th’ other
first: Man therefore shall find grace / The other
none” (130–32). Thus, “in Mercy and Justice
both” his glory will “excel, / But Mercy first
and last shall brightest shine” (132–34).
But what is true for Man and the angels
is true for the Son as well: to please his father,
he must be free to obey or disobey and offer
his life for Man or not. As the Father affirms,
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity,
Not mee.
(107–11)

This judicial encounter between God and
Man presents a test for the Son: like Adam in
book 8, he must demonstrate that he knows
both himself and God and can fathom what
it means to be the Father’s most perfect image
and “chief delight” (168). But more than this,
he must reveal who he is through choice and
thus merit his status as the “[o]nly begotten
Son” (80). He must discern the will of God
and then volunteer to renounce his place next
to the Father (“I for [Man’s] sake will leave /
Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee / Freely
put off” [238–40]), demonstrating the lesson
that he makes explicit in Paradise Regained:
“who best / Can suffer, best can do; best reign,
who first / Well hath obey’d” (3.194–96).
The Son also recognizes that mercy is as
necessary to God as it is to Man, and he acts
on the recognition. Without it, he observes,
God’s “goodness and . . . greatness” would
“[b]e question’d and blasphem’d without defense” (165–66). But for reasons I will return
to later, the Father alone cannot resolve the
conflict between mercy and justice: he can
“renew / [Man’s] lapsed powers” so that “once
more he shall stand / On even ground against
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atry before a “savory obedience to Christs
example,” which is obedience to God. As Michael tells Adam, the Messiah will destroy Satan’s works “by fulfilling that which [Adam]
didst want, / Obedience to the Law of God”
(Paradise Lost 12.396–97). Instead of receiving special attention, the Crucifixion—deftly
converted into an act of triumphant heroism
(“nail’d to the Cross / By his own Nation,
slain for bringing Life; / But to the Cross he
nails thy Enemies” [413–15])—is folded into
the history of the Son’s return to “[h]is seat at
God’s right hand,” the Second Coming, and
the final transformation of Earth into “Paradise, far happier place / Than this of Eden”
(457, 464–65). Although he learns that the redeemer will suffer and die for his transgression, Adam does not make the martyrdom
the focus of his devotion. He praises God the
Father as the ultimate source of goodness,
and Michael does not correct him.
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his mortal foe,” but he cannot simply remit the
death sentence that Man has incurred: “Die
hee or Justice must” (175–76, 178–79, 210).
Thus, he asks if there is in “all Heaven charity
so dear” to “pay / The rigid satisfaction, death
for death,” for Man’s crime (216, 211–12). After a dramatic silence (“all the Heav’nly Choir
stood mute . . . / And now without redemption all mankind / Must have been lost” [217,
222–23]), the Son declares that “man shall find
grace” and offers himself: “Behold mee then,
mee for him, life for life / I offer, on mee let
thine anger fall” (227, 236–37). Behind these
lines stands another sacrificial offer, Nisus’s
attempt to save the life of his friend Euryalus
in book 9 of the Aeneid: “On me—on me—
here am I who did the deed—on me turn your
steel, Rutulians!” (“me, me, adsum qui feci, in
me converitite ferrum, / O Rutuli!”).7 Whereas
Nisus tries to exchange his life for Euryalus’s
after their two-m an raid on the Rutulian
camp gives way to a failed escape and retribution, the Son pledges his life to save Man, the
collective identity of humanity. Nisus could
have slipped off into the dark woods and saved
himself, but the “one love” (“amor unus”;
9.182) that unites the two Trojans compels
him to risk, offer, and finally sacrifice his life
for Euryalus. The Son, “[i]n whom the fullness
dwells of love divine,” could have remained
silent, but he offers himself “for Man, [to] be
judg’d and die, / And dying rise, and rising
with him raise / His Brethren” (225, 295–97).
Noting this parallel, Barbara Lewalski
claims that it deliberately evokes the “deeds
of bravery and self-sacrifice inspired by erotic
love and noble friendship” to illustrate “how
the Son’s heroic love transcends and transvalues the heroic virtues and actions central
to epic and romance” (116–17). But Milton, I
would argue, is focused specifically on friendship here: by fashioning the Son’s voluntary
offer after Nisus’s willingness to die for his
friend, he suggests that “Heroic Martyrdom”
incorporates and transcends the ideal of selfs acrifice central to the classical friendship
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tradition: caritas subsumes amicitia (Paradise
Lost 9.32). The highest expression of love, this
tradition repeatedly asserts, is the willingness
to die so that someone else might live.
The two pairs of classical friends who
fueled this tradition—Orestes and Pylades
and the young Pythagoreans Damon and
Pythias—faced situations in which one
friend was condemned to death but survived
because of his companion’s loyalty and selfsacrifice. In De amicitia, Cicero locates such
gestures in a cosmic context. Invoking the
theory “that in nature and the entire universe
whatever things are at rest and whatever are
in motion are united by friendship and scattered by discord,” Cicero has his spokesman
Laelius continue:
And indeed this is a statement that all men
not only understand but also approve. Whenever, therefore, there comes to light some
signal service in undergoing or sharing the
dangers of a friend, who does not proclaim
it with the loudest praise? What shouts recently rang through the entire theater during
the performance of the new play, written by
my guest and friend, Marcus Pacuvius, at the
scene where, the king being ignorant of which
of the two was Orestes, Pylades, who wished
to be put to death instead of his friend, declared, “I am Orestes,” while Orestes continued steadfastly to assert, as was the fact, “I am
Orestes!” The people in the audience rose to
their feet and cheered this incident in fiction.

(135; pt. 7, sec. 24)

Through their offer of self-s acrifice, both
friends unwittingly demonstrate their harmony with the natural forces that give coherence and order to the universe. The audience
members celebrate the pair’s heroism because,
Cicero maintains, they instinctively recognize
that it embodies and exemplifies the concord
that holds both human society and the natural world together.
Likewise, the Son’s offer to die for Man
expresses his voluntary decision to conform to
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And vital virtue infus’d, and vital warmth
Throughout the fluid Mass, but downward
   purg’d
The black tartareous cold Infernal dregs
Adverse to life; then founded, then conglob’d
Like things to like, the rest to several place
Disparted, and between spun out the Air,
And Earth self-balanc’t on her Centre hung.

(234–42)

The law of nature includes the bond of amity
(“Like things to like”) that extends from the
elements through the natural world to human
society—a bond that degenerates as a consequence of the Fall. Thus, after the flood restores
the world to its original state, “not content /
With fair equality, fraternal state,” Nimrod
will “quite dispossess / Concord and the law of
Nature from the Earth” (12.25–26, 28–29).
As both a creature and the instrument of
subsequent creation, the Son has an exceptionally close relation to these laws: he is the
medium through which discord is resolved
into concord. Man’s disobedience not only
introduces discord into human history, but
it also alienates the Father and threatens to
set him at odds with himself. He would like
to show mercy to his “youngest son” but must
enact justice (3.151): “Die hee or Justice must.”
When the Son discerns this “strife / Of Mercy
and Justice” in the Father’s “face,” he ends it

by offering “himself to die / For man’s offence”
(406–07, 409–10). After his sacrifice and final
defeat of Death, he envisions returning “with
the multitude of [his] redeem’d” to see the
Father’s “face, wherein no cloud / Of anger
shall remain, but peace assur’d, / And reconcilement” (260, 262–64). The Father confirms
this prediction, praising the Son: “O thou in
Heav’n and Earth the only peace / Found out
for mankind under wrath, O thou / My sole
complacence!” (274–76). In offering himself,
the Son has cleared away the conflict from the
Father’s countenance, preemptively atoned for
mankind’s disobedience, and initiated the historical process that will produce “New Heav’n
and Earth” and the ultimate expression of
union and concord, the time when “God shall
be All in All” (335, 341). Like Pylades’s willingness to sacrifice himself for Orestes, the
Son’s pledge represents the apotheosis of the
amity that animates the universe and prevents
it from slipping back into Chaos. This demonstration of “immortal love” fills the angelic audience with “Admiration,” and after the Father
praises the Son’s offer and unveils the course
of human history, they celebrate with “sacred
Song . . . / No voice exempt, no voice but well
could join / Melodious part, such concord is
in Heav’n” (267, 271, 345–46, 370–71).
Thus, the judicial scene in book 3 invokes
an episode familiar from the classical friendship tradition: at the moment when a monarch condemns a man to death, his friend
intervenes to take the entire punishment on
himself, and this heroic display of self less
love compels the monarch to relent, saving
them both. Milton foregrounds this dimension of the Son’s relation to Man in book 10,
where God sends him to the garden as “Man’s
Friend, his Mediator, his design’d / Both Ransom and Redeemer voluntary” (58–60). The
Son’s act of “unexampled love” saves Man
and establishes the pattern of self-s acrifice
that classical friends and Christian martyrs
will emulate (3.410)—the former by adhering
to the laws of nature, the latter by adhering
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the will of God and the law of nature. Milton
always believed, as he tells Claudius Salmasius,
“that the law of God does most closely agree
with the law of nature” (Defensio 422), and
in Paradise Lost the law of nature comprises
the same forces that govern Cicero’s universe.
When the Son rides out into Chaos “to create
new Worlds,” he creates by imposing concord
and amity on Chaos: “Silence, ye troubl’d
waves, and thou Deep, peace, / Said then
th’ Omnific Word, your discord end” (7.216–
17). At the same time, “on the wat’ry calm / His
brooding wings the Spirit of God outspread,”
an image that invokes the emblematic peace of
the brooding halcyon as well as the dove,
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to Christ’s words “Greater love hath no man
than this, that a man lay down his life for
his friends” (Bible, John 15.13). Although
Man and this “one greater Man” must pass
through death to eternal life, the Son’s offer
guarantees that both will live (1.4). It is also
the act that declares him “by Merit more than
Birthright Son of God, / Found worthiest to
be so by being Good, / Far more than Great
or High” (3.308–10). His friendship to Man
justifies his anointment and the powers that
he has already obtained, as well as those he
will receive.
Rigid Satisfaction
But heroic displays of friendship do more than
save and ennoble the individual friends: they
have a transformative power that can convert
tyrants into benevolent monarchs. The mutual love of Orestes and Pylades, as Thomas
Elyot observes in The Boke Named the Governour, has just this effect: “Thus a long tyme
they to gither contendinge, the one to die for
the other, at last so relented the fierse and cruell hart of the tyrant: that wondring at their
marvailous frendship, he suffered them frely
to depart, without doing them any damage”
(152). The loyalty of Damon and Pythias has
the same result:
Wherfore he desired the minister of justice to
lose his fellow, and to prepare the execution on
hym, that had given the occasion: wherat the
tyraunt being all abashed commaunded bothe
to be brought in his presence: and whan he had
ynough wondered at their noble hartes and
their constance in very frendship, he offring
to them great rewards, desired them to receive
hym into their company: and so doinge them
moche honour, dyd set them at liberte. (153)

On a purely literary level, the Son’s offer produces a similar outcome. It enables God to
transform himself from a vengeful to a forgiving monarch, allowing his mercy to transcend his justice. Indeed, the Father courts

[

PM L A

this transformation—or, more accurately, the
revelation of his true character—to make Satan’s charge of “tyrant” ring false.
In his conduct, however, Milton’s God
is closer to a constitutional monarch than to
the tyrants who condemn classical friends.
He has judged correctly and is constrained by
his own integrity. To free himself and demonstrate that he is great and good, he needs
the Son to be both “Man’s friend” and “a sacrifice / Glad to be offer’d” (3.270). In Paradise
Lost, Milton rejects the traditional Anselmian
understanding of the atonement as a debt that
Man owes to God, a debt that Christ must pay
for him because he cannot pay it, and adopts
a position similar to the one that Hugo Grotius presents in De satisfactione Christi (1617):
God rules creation as a political state and
has an obligation to punish crimes against
that state. As a creditor and injured party, he
could remit the debt. As a sovereign, he cannot allow crimes to go unpunished:
But yet all is not done; Man disobeying,
Disloyal breaks his fealty, and sins
Against the high Supremacy of Heav’n,
Affecting God-head, and so losing all,
To expiate his Treason hath naught left,
But to destruction sacred and devote,
He with his whole posterity must die,
Die hee or Justice must; unless for him
Some other able, and as willing, pay
The rigid satisfaction, death for death.

(203–12)

Like Satan’s open rebellion against God,
Adam and Eve’s disobedience is an act of
treason. In return for abstaining from the
fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, “[t]he Pledge
of th[eir] Obedience and th[eir] Faith,” they
are granted their “happy State”: their internal
state of perfection, their state of bliss in the
garden, and the political state (“thy Realm is
large,” God tells Adam) that they have been
given (8.325, 331, 375). By transgressing and
“[a]ffecting God-head,” they are asserting
their own absolute sovereignty over the states
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failed to produce the accused in court” (73).8
Pythias’s willingness to serve as the ransom
and hostage that will guarantee Damon’s return, along with the shared identity produced
by their friendship, satisfies the demands of
Roman law, and their story provides a parallel for the substitution of Christ for mankind.
Milton turns to the friendship tradition—
echoing Nisus’s words, staging the heroic offer, and declaring the Son “Man’s friend”—for
the same reasons that Grotius does: to justify
the atonement and the God who requires it.
Unexampled Love
In Paradise Lost, the Son’s offer, “Behold mee
then, mee for him, life for life,” stands at the
center of a series of heroic echoes. Satan’s
willingness to risk Chaos and “unessential
Night” on his voyage to the newly created
world as the “last hope” of the fallen angels
provides a disturbing parallel (2.439, 416).
The dramatic situation follows the same pattern—a call for a redeemer, silence, an offer,
bent knees, praise, and a “firm concord” of
the devils—and in the end Satan will be crucified by the Son’s redemptive sacrifice (“But
to the Cross he nails thy Enemies”; 2.497). But
Adam and Eve’s echoes of the Son are more
significant. As Milton writes in De doctrina,
“[T]he effect and end of the whole mediatorial
administration is the satisfaction of divine
justice on behalf of all men, and the shaping
of the faithful in the image of Christ” (443).
This refashioning of the faithful begins with
Adam and Eve’s repentance, which is itself
enabled by prevenient grace. Adam’s accusations against God give way to the recognition
of his own guilt and of the fact that his crime
has doomed his future offspring. This admission leads Adam to the idea of self-sacrifice,
something that he wistfully entertains but
dismisses as impossible:
first and last
On mee, mee only as the source and spring
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with which they have been entrusted; they are
claiming the offices that have been delegated
to them as their own, seceding from union
with God, and seeking to divide the indivisible kingdom of creation. They sin against
not just God but also the order of things, “the
high Supremacy of Heav’n.” God must punish
them or violate his own decrees, and violating the decrees would be to rule by personal
whim, not law—the Aristotelian definition of
a tyrant. But according to Roman public law,
which is the theoretical framework that Grotius uses in De satisfactione, God could alter
the penalty and demand some other satisfaction. As Shuger summarizes Grotius’s position, “[I]n the Atonement, God exercises his
imperium by relaxing the universal sentence
of death the law imposed on humankind for
the sin of Adam and substituting the Crucifixion as a minatory exemplum” (59).
What is at stake for both Milton and
Grotius is the morality of the atonement—
the morality of killing an innocent person for
someone else’s crime. De satisfactione, Shuger
demonstrates, attempts to ward off the Socinian critique of the atonement—a rationalist
rejection of mystical substitution—by demonstrating that it conforms to the “rational
principles of justice and fairness” epitomized
by Roman public law (65). But this legal code
allowed for penal substitution only for particular crimes, including treason and civil revolt, and under certain conditions: the victim
must consent to be substituted for the other
party, and the two parties must have a connection to each other and thus have some
kind of corporate identity. As Milton’s God
stresses, the substitute must be “able, and
as willing, [to] pay / The rigid satisfaction.”
Shuger observes that Grotius, to support his
argument, “searches outside the law for Classical precedent, reinterpreting the story of
Damon and Pythias, for instance, not as an
exemplum of true friendship—the standard
Renaissance reading—but as evidence for the
ancient practice of executing sureties if they
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Of all corruption, all blame lights due;
So might the wrath. Fond wish! (10.831–34)

Undeterred by Adam’s wrath toward her, Eve
“besought / His peace,” seeking to take the
entire death sentence upon herself:
[I] . . . to the place of judgment will return,
There with my cries importune Heaven, that all
The sentence from thy head remov’d may light
On me, sole cause to thee of all this woe,
Mee mee only just object of his ire.
(931–36)

Of course, it is too late. Since they are both
guilty, both have lost their immortality, and
neither can offer to die for the other or their
descendants. They have nothing with which
to bargain: they are both dead. But just as the
Son dispels the wrath and discord of the Father with his voluntary offer of self-sacrifice,
Eve’s offer brings “peace” and leads to her reconciliation with Adam (who responds “with
peaceful words”), which results in their repentance and prayer (938, 946). She demonstrates the virtues of the Son more fully than
Adam does, and her embrace of “the better
fortitude / Of Patience and Heroic Martyrdom” restores their relationship, which is a
precondition for the Incarnation (9.31–32).
Earlier Eve describes Adam’s willingness to eat the fruit and join her, whatever the
punishment, as a “glorious trial of exceeding
Love” (9.961). But the Son’s act of “unexampled
love” provides a preemptive critique of Adam’s
choice and establishes an alternative that is
much closer to amicitia than eros. Adam fails
his trial of love because he decides to die with
Eve. He never imagines that he could die for
her. Instead, he indulges in the narcissism
of romantic love: like Romeo and Juliet, he
would rather kill himself than live without his
partner. Likewise, falling into another romantic fallacy, Eve loves Adam so much that she
would rather kill him than have him live without her. Neither can imagine the kind of selfsacrificing love that Nisus exemplifies: “no, no,
kill me instead.” Neither can imagine dying so
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that the other might live—without him or her.
Once Eve has eaten the fruit, Adam is in the
same position as Nisus, Pythias, and Pylades.
His partner is condemned to death, and yet
he still has his own life to offer instead. But
he fails, “submitting to what seem’d remediless” (919). As the word does in the reference
to “other Worlds” in book 3, “seem’d” suggests
that there are possibilities and alternatives
that the poem cannot pursue. In book 9 it suggests that there is a remedy that Adam overlooks, and presumably—as C. S. Lewis and
several subsequent critics have suggested—it
is to offer his life for Eve’s.9 How this would
work is unclear. Perhaps Adam’s offer would
be enough to “pay / The rigid satisfaction” for
Eve’s fall. Or perhaps, like the brothers Castor
and Pollux, they would share one immortal
life between them.
But the idea that Adam could have acted
as Eve’s redeemer poses a theological problem. In orthodox Christianity, only God can
play this role. Christ pays a debt no other being could because of the divinity he brings as
God, and thus he performs a sacrifice that is
unique and beyond comprehension and imitation. This is the Christ of Herbert’s “The Sacrifice.” But this is not Milton’s theology. His
distinction between the Father and the Son
makes merit, not essence, the crucial factor:
[T]he Bible nowhere states that only God can
approach God, or take away sin, or fulfil the
law, or endure and overcome the anger of
God, the power of Satan and temporal and
eternal death, or recover the blessings lost by
us. What it does state is that he whom God has
empowered to do all this can do it: in other
words, God’s beloved Son with whom God has
declared himself pleased. (De doctrina 425)

The power to redeem is not an intrinsic characteristic of the Son. It is something that the
Father endows him with—just as he provides
him with “the Chariot of Paternal Deity” for
routing the rebel angels and with “golden
Compasses” for circumscribing the universe
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Say Heav’nly Powers, where shall we find
   such love,
Which of ye will be mortal to redeem
Mans mortal crime, and just th’ unjust to save,
Dwells in all Heaven charity so dear? (3.213–16)

In his omniscience, God tells us that this sacrifice will be made, that someone will offer to
do it. If the Son is the only figure capable of
performing this task, he is being appointed to
do it at this moment; he is being coerced into
offering himself, and the drama of the scene
is a disingenuous political spectacle like the
one Satan and Beelzebub orchestrate in Hell.
If someone else can offer—one of the angels,
perhaps, as the passage suggests—then the
Son’s offer is voluntary. After he has volunteered, God praises his singular heroism and
announces the Incarnation: “Thou therefore
whom thou only canst redeem, / Thir Nature
also to thy Nature join” (281–82).
In Milton’s God, William Empson argues
that God is wicked, Milton knew it, and Milton’s heresies work to mitigate that wickedness.10 Whatever we conclude about Empson’s
initial claim, Milton’s Arianism and, in Christopher Hill’s words, his “abandonment of traditional ideas of Christ’s atonement” radically
transform the individual’s relation to God
(286). Milton turns away from the Passion for
reasons quite different from those of Donne
and Herbert. He rejects it as a spectacle that disempowers the individual believer. By turning
our gaze away from the suffering on Golgotha
and directing our attention to the offer to “take
me instead of him,” Milton privileges a mode of
heroism that individuals can both contemplate
and imitate—because Milton’s Arian theology
brings Man closer to Christ at the same time
as it distances the Son from God the Father.

Instead of a scene that evokes human corruption, limitation, and irreparable debt, Milton
offers an ethical decision—the self-sacrifice of
Nisus writ large as heroic martyrdom—that
encourages human agency. Is Christ’s sacrifice unique? For Milton it seems so because the
Son offered to die for Man and became the redeemer, whereas Adam failed to offer himself
for Eve. It seems so because these choices were
made and our history has run its course. But on
those stars that seem to be “other Worlds,” perhaps other Eves will resist temptation and other
Adams will not fall victim to what “seem’d remediless.” For Milton the word “seem’d” takes
on vast import: it suggests the unrealized alternatives that free his characters, his epic, and his
God from the tyranny of necessity.

Notes
I am grateful to Elliott Visconsi for inviting me to present
an early version of this essay at the Medieval and Renaissance Colloquium at Yale University and to Kathleen
Vejvoda, Steve Fallon, and John Rumrich for their generous responses to various drafts. I would also like to thank
Heather Nabbefeld for her help with Melanchthon’s Latin.
1. Building on the work of Maurice Kelley, Bauman’s
Milton’s Arianism persuasively argues that “Arian” is the
most accurate term for Milton’s antitrinitarianism. “Simply put, if what was condemned at the council of Nicea
was Arianism,” Bauman writes, “then John Milton was
an Arian” (2). Also see Rumrich, “Milton’s Arianism.”
Lieb argues against the validity of the term (261–78), but
the objections that he raises are not new and have been
either addressed or refuted by Bauman. For the initial
reaction to the recovery of De doctrina, see Kelley, This
Great Argument 3–7, and his introduction to De doctrina.
Bauman, “Heresy,” demonstrates that a number of early
readers of Paradise Lost suspected Milton of Arianism.
2. William B. Hunter first challenged Milton’s authorship of De doctrina in 1991 (“Provenance” and Visitation). The committee assembled to address the resulting
controversy recently confirmed Milton’s authorship of
the treatise (Campbell et al.).
3. The subject of Paradise Regained—the temptation
of Christ rather than his Passion—has long been taken
as evidence of Milton’s discomfort with the Crucifixion
and a sign that his theory of the atonement must be heterodox. See Rogers, “Milton’s Circumcision,” on Milton,
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(6.750, 7.225). Presumably God could empower Adam, or another created being, to act
as the redeemer. Indeed, if the Son were the
only figure capable of redeeming Man, the
scene where God asks for a volunteer to pay
Man’s debt would be undercut:
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the Crucifixion, and the atonement; see Huttar for the
problem of the Passion and Paradise Regained.
4. My trans. The original reads, “Unus est filius Dei,
Dom inus noster Iesus Christus, qui cum in hunc mun
dum prodisset, tantum semel mortuus est, et resuscitatus.
Nec alibi se ostendit, nec alibi mortuus aut resuscitatus
est. Non igitur imaginandum est, plures esse mundos,
quia nec imaginandum est, saepius Christum mortuum et
resuscitatum esse, nec cogitandum est, in ullo alio mundo
sine agnitione fili Dei, hominibus restitui vitam aeternam” (folio 43). Also see McColley 412–13 and Dick 88–
89. In Donne and the New Philosophy, especially “Donne
the Space Man” (78–128), Empson argues that Donne was
inspired by the theological freedom of other worlds. C. S.
Lewis explores extraterrestrial life in a Christian cosmos in his science fiction trilogy, Out of the Silent Planet
(1938), Perelander (1943), and That Hideous Strength
(1945), works influenced by his reading of Milton.
5. Tenure 198. See Rumrich, “Milton’s God,” for the
relation between the imposition of order and tyranny; see
Rogers, Matter 112–22, for the radical decentralization
implicit in Milton’s animist materialism (or vitalism) and
for its relation to political liberalism.
6. Strier convincingly argues that Milton has “a coherent ethical position” that is “distinctly classical rather
than Christian” (258), but Strier does not connect Milton’s investment in dignity to his Arianism.
7. Virgil 9.427–28. Fowler and Leonard note this allusion in their editions of Paradise Lost, as do earlier editors. Modeled after book 10 of the Iliad (the “Doloneia”),
the Nisus and Euryalus episode influences later epics, including Ariosto’s Orlando Furioso and Tasso’s Jerusalem
Delivered. See Hardie 23–34.
8. Grotius writes, “So, too, in capital punishments
the sureties were commonly put to death, if the defendants did not appear (whence they are called antipsuchoi
by the Greeks), as is sufficiently clear from, among other
sources, that noble story of Damon and Pythias” (“Sic et
in capitalibus iudiciis vades capite plecti solitos, si rei se
non sisterent, unde Graecis αντιψυχοι appellantur, tum
aliunde, tum ex nobili illa Damonis et Pythiae historia
satis apparet”; 168–69; bk. 4, sec. 16]).
9. Lewis 121–24; Fish 261–72; Danielson, “Through
the Telescope”; Leonard, Naming 213–32.
10. Although some of what Empson wrote has been
qualified or superseded, one of his key insights remains
valid: Milton’s heresies tend to “cut out of Christianity . . .
the torture-horror” of the Crucifixion (269). For a rebuttal, see Danielson, Milton’s Good God.
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